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R. v. BUTLER: RECOGNIZING THE 
EXPRESSIVE VALUE AND THE 
HARM IN PORNOGRAPHY 
The subject matter of the material under re-
view ... is sexual activity. Such activity is part 
of the human experience . . . . The depiction of 
such activity has the potential of titillating some 
and of informing others. How can images which 
have such effect be meaningless?l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American courts have traditionally regulated pornography 
when it falls within the United States Supreme Court's defini-
tion of obscenity.2 Pornography3 falls within this definition when 
courts find the sexual explicitness in pornographic material of-
fensive and corrupting to the moral fiber of the community.· An-
other view has developed, however, which recognizes that por-
nography inflicts harm on society through its debasing 
1. R. v. Butler, 1 W.W.R. 97 (Man. 1990) (Twaddle, J., dissenting), cited with ap-
proval in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 487 (Can.). 
2. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The definition of obscenity as the 
authors of this comment will use it is set forth in Miller. The Miller definition deems 
pornographic material obscene when the average person, applying contemporary stan-
dards, finds that the material as a whole appeals to the prurient interest, is patently 
offensive, and lacks any serious literary or artistic value. See discussion infra notes 24-25 
and accompanying text. 
3. The authors of this comment are conscious that the term "pornography" is elu-
sive and takes on different meanings depending on who is using it. See infra notes 33-36 
and accompanying text for discussion of the anti-pornography feminists' view that por-
nography is a civil rights violation. See also infra part ILA for a discussion of the current 
Supreme Court's view of pornography. "Pornography" as used in this comment, means 
graphic depictions of sex between individuals conveyed through the medium of videos, 
films, books, or magazines. Pornography's function is to sexually arouse its viewers. The 
authors purposely give the term a neutral meaning, and except where specific adjectives 
such as "violent" or "degrading" are added in the text, the reader should take this term 
as it has been defined here. 
4. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 908-17 (2d 
ed. 1988) (discussing the roots of the Miller test). 
651 
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depictions of women and children. a 
The recent Canadian Supreme Court decision of R. v. But-
ler6 recognizes and addresses the harmful anti-social attitudes 
and behaviors towards women which are perpetuated by miso-
gynistic, violent pornography.7 Meanwhile, American courts con-
tinue to grapple with their traditional obscenity standard.s 
This comment presents an overview of the American ap-
proach to regulating and categorizing pornography, and explores 
the obstacles this approach creates for addressing the issues of 
harm to women. The pivotal elements of the Butler court's anal-
ysis will be discussed in light of American decisions. The authors 
propose that a But ler analysis offers a more honest and balanced 
approach to the pornography issue, and that such an approach 
would be feasible within the parameters of the First Amendment 
in the United States. 
II. THE AMERICAN APPROACH 
The controversy surrounding pornography stems from the 
clash between the First Amendment9 and forms of pornographic 
expression which denigrate large sections of society, yet do not 
fall within the American obscenity definition. to The obscenity 
definition categorizes explicit depictions of sex "obscene" when 
they are deviant from, and offensive to, societal mores.ll Porno-
5. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 197 
(1989) (discussing abuse and sex discrimination caused by debasing pornographic depic-
tions). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (recognizing that child pornog-
raphy causes serious physical and emotional harm to children). 
6. (1992) 1 S.C.R. at 452 (Can.) (creating a new definition for obscene materials and 
pornography based on harm). 
7. [d. at 510-11. 
8. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (setting forth the guidelines for determining whether 
pornographic materials are obscene). 
9. The relevant language of the first amendment is: "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10. For a selection of varying perspectives surrounding the pornography debate, see 
generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (1986); Martin Karo 
and Marcia McBrian, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Proposing A Pornography 
Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 J. OF L. REF. 179, 184 (1989); Thomas 
I. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 
3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 130 (1984). 
11. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 199. Professor MacKinnon stresses that ob-
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graphic material falls within this obscenity definition when a 
court deems its sexual explicitness "patently offensive. "12 
In determining whether a restriction on speech can be justi-
fied, the Supreme Court requires courts to balance the value of 
speech against other compelling interests. 13 With obscenity, the 
Court deems preserving the morals of society a compelling inter-
est which outweighs the minimal expressive value in certain sex-
ually explicit materials. 14 The rationale behind the Court's treat-
ment of obscenity as minimally expressive, however, has never 
been clearly articulated. U 
scenity is more concerned with whether men blush than with the harm it causes to 
women. The American definition of obscenity stems from what is seen as sexual impu-
rity: "[T)he modern rule is that obscenity is measured by the erotic allurement upon the 
average modern reader; that the erotic allurement of a book is measured by whether it is 
sexually impure - i.e., pornographic, 'dirt for dirt's sake,' a calculated incitement to 
sexual desire .... " WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM 199 (quoting Roth v. 
Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1948». One of the major problems with the obscen· 
ity definition is its failure to provide a clear workable set of guidelines for clarifying what 
materials fall within the "obscene" category. The famous utterance of Justice Stewart, "I 
know it when I see it," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), testifies to this. See 
also KENDRICK at 194-200 for different definitions of obscenity in the U.S., which gener-
ally target the "lewd offensiveness" of sexually explicit material. Several definitions 
make a distinction between normal and deviant sexual desires. 
12. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19. 
13. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that first amendment concerns outweighed any articulated interest of a pro-
posed anti·pornography ordinance). C{. Kathleen Mahoney, Canadian Constitutional 
Approach To Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992) (discussing the Canadian Charter, which, unlike the United 
States Constitution, expressly requires a balancing of freedom of speech against equality 
concerns). 
14. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991); Hudnut, 771 F.2d 
at 331 (finding that pornography which does not fall within the obscenity definition is 
expression and thus merits first amendment protection); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12·16; 
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 602-04 (discussing speech regulation on the basis of the 
speech's value and the harm it produces). 
15. It is unclear why the United States has placed obscenity outside first amend-
ment protection. The Court in Miller assumed that obscenity was unprotected speech: 
"This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unpro· 
tected by the first amendment." Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. See also Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 484·85 (1951) (relying on tradition and the historical treatment of obscene 
ity as a rationale for placing it outside the protection of the first amendment); TRIBE, 
supra note 4, § 12-16. (discussing some of the reasons offered by courts for why obscenity 
could justify suppression of speech); Louis Henkin, Morals and The Constitution: The 
Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1963) (discussing the fact that obscen-
ity laws are motivated by traditional notions of religion and morals). 
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A. PORNOGRAPHY AS UNPROTECTED EXPRESSION 
In United States v. Roth,16 the Court upheld a conviction 
under a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of "obscene, 
lewd, lascivious or filthy" materials. 17 The Court ruled the mate-
rial "obscene" and thus outside First Amendment protection 
since it was "utterly without socially redeeming value."18 The 
Court distinguished between material which expresses ideas, no 
matter how controversial or unpopular, and obscenity, which, ac-
cording to the Court, merely arouses the senses.19 
Twenty-two years later, in Miller v. California,20 the Su-
preme Court rejected the constitutional standard set forth in 
Roth.21 While agreeing with Roth's holding that obscene mate-
rial is unprotected by the First Amendment,22 the Court set 
forth a new American obscenity standard.23 The Miller test fo-
cuses on whether an average person, applying contemporary 
standards, would find that the subject as a whole: a) appeals to a 
prurient24 interest, b) depicts or describes in a patently offensive 
way sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law, 
and c) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
16. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting mailing of obscene 
materials). 
17. [d. at 491. 
18. [d. at 484. See also JoEllen Lane, Note, Osborne v. Ohio, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 427, 
428-30 (1991) (discussing the Roth decision). 
19. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (discussing the function that pornography serves). 
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a California criminal obscenity statute which pro-
hibited thrusting aggressive sales of obscene materials upon unwilling recipients). 
21. [d. at 22-23. 
22. The key to the Roth decision and the later Miller holding was the Court's rejec-
tion of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment: 
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full 
protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless ex-
cludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more 
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First 
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without re-
deeming social importance .... 
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484, cited with approval in Miller, 413 U.S. at 20. 
23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
24. "Prurient," as defined by the Miller Court, means "a shameful or morbid inter-
est in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of can-
dor .... " [d. at 17 n.1. 
4
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value.211 The Miller test is narrowly construed to comport with 
First Amendment concerns.26 
The Miller Court held that obscene speech embodies none 
of the traditional political and ideological values which the First 
Amendment was primarily designed to protect:27 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly lim-
ited classes of speech, the prevention and punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem. These include the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality. 28 
25. [d. at 25. The underlying concern of the Miller Court was that courts remain 
sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
expression. 
26. [d. at 23-24 (discussing the dangers of regulating any form of expression with 
respect to the first amendment). The Court in Miller required that sexual acts be de-
picted in a patently offensive way. This includes sexual acts which are actual or simu-
lated. In theory this can include medium-core or soft-core pornography. The reality of 
the Miller test, however, is that the standard set is so rigorous that pornography flour-
ishes in violation of existing laws. See Bruce A. Taylor, Hard Core Pornography: A Pro-
posal for a Per Se Rule, 21 J. OF L. REF. 255, 275-76 (1988). See generally 1 A'ITORNEY 
GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT 367 (1986) 
[hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY]. 
27. Miller, 413 U.S. at 34. In answering the dissenting justices' concern about the 
suppression of speech, the majority in Miller held that, "to equate the free and robust 
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material 
demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the 
historic struggle for freedom." [d. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50, 70 (1976): 
[Ilt is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of 
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than 
the interest in untrammelled political debate .... Whether 
political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to ap-
plaud or to despise what is said, every school child can under-
stand why our duty to defend the right t~ speak remains the 
same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off 
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual 
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. 
28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
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This "expression versus non-expression" dichotomy stems 
from the traditional moral perspective the United States has 
adopted towards explicit sex:29 "[I]t [has been] common to dis-
miss the case against pornography as the product of prudishness 
or inhibition, a kind of aesthetic distaste not grounded in con-
crete showings of harm. Regulation of sexually explicit material 
has thus been based on its offensiveness."3o 
In Miller, the Court held that states had a legitimate inter-
est in avoiding "the significant danger of offending the sensibili-
ties of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles."31 The 
justification for regulating obscenity was to maintain the moral 
decency of the community.32 
The moral foundation of the American obscenity doctrine 
has been vigorously attacked in recent years by anti-pornogra-
phy feminists and theorists.33 According to anti-pornography 
feminists, a gender-neutral view of what is "patently offensive" 
turns obscenity into a question of what the patriarchial majority 
at any given time sees as good taste.34 
29. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2457 (holding that state's police power to provide for 
the public health, safety and morals justified regulation of public nudity and nude danc-
ing); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that states have the 
power to make a "morally neutral judgment" to maintain a decent society); Henkin, 
supra note 15, at 393 (discussing the country's religious antecelients of governmental 
responsibility for communal and individual decency and morality); Catharine A. MacK-
innon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 291, 322 ("Obscenity law is concerned 
with morality, specifically morals from the male point of view .... "). 
30. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594. 
31. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18. 
32. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16. See also MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 329 (assert-
ing that the Supreme Court's view of obscenity is that, "Obscenity at bottom is not a 
crime. Obscenity is a sin."). 
33. For a comprehensive examination of the feminist movement against pornogra-
phy starting in 1970, focusing on MacKinnon and Dworkin's accomplishments in the 
anti-pornography struggle, see generally Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Femi-
nism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis,39 STAN. 
L. REV. 607 (1987). 
34. See MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 331-32: 
The outcome, descriptively analyzed, is that obscenity law 
prohibits what it sees as immoral, which from a feminist 
standpoint tends to be relatively harmless, while protecting 
what it sees as moral, which from a feminist standpoint is 
often that which is damaging to women .... What male mo-
rality finds evil, meaning threatening to its power, feminist 
politics tends to find comparatively harmless. What feminist 
politics identifies as central in our subordination - i.e. the 
6
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The obscenity label created by the Supreme Court fails to 
consider the reality of pornographic material which falls within 
the obscenity definition. 311 The American obscenity doctrine's 
rigid framework ignores pornography's capacity to communicate 
ideas.38 
Pornography is more than "dirt for dirt's sake;"37 it is a 
form of expression which conveys ideas and attitudes through its 
depictions of sex.38 What are depictions of sex if they are not 
expression?39 Books, magazines, and movies, by their very na-
ture, are forms of expression.40 Pornography can express the cel-
ebration of consensual and liberating sexuality.41 Pornography 
can also dehumanize and objectify its participants, resulting in 
deleterious effects on behavior and attitudes.42 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized the avoidance of certain societal harms as justifying regu-
erotization of dominance and submission - male morality will 
tend to find comparatively harmless or defend as affirmatively 
valuable, hence protected speech. 
35. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1985) (discussing how the United States courts ignore the 
complex issues surrounding pornography and the insidious effects pornography has on 
societal beliefs). 
36. See Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 183 ("The Court assumed a dichotomy 
between material that presented ideas, no matter how controversial or hateful, and mate-
rial intended purely to titillate or excite. "). 
37. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 492. 
38. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (recognizing the power of pornography as speech). 
39. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting): 
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that 
sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human exis-
tence, central to family life, community, welfare, and the de-
velopment of human personality." The fact that individuals 
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate 
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as di-
verse as ours ... that much of the richness of a relationship 
will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the 
form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. 
[d. at 205 (citations omitted). 
40. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 488. 
41. [d. at 500 (discussing "good" pornography which validates women's will to pleas-
ure). See generally LONNIE BARBACH, PLEASURES: WOMEN WRITE EROTICA (1984). 
42. See HARRY CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL 
SOCIETY 242 (1969). The author defines pornography as "a certain kind of obscenity - it 
is sexual obscenity in which the debasement of the human element is heavily accentu-
ated, is depicted in great physiological detail, and is carried very far toward its utmost 
logical conclusion." [d. 
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lation of speech;u The Court has not, however, considered de-. 
basing depictions of women such a harm.44 With obscenity, the 
Court considers offensiveness the "harm" which justifies placing 
obscene speech outside First Amendment protection.411 This 
leads to an inconsistent and unworkable approach which offers 
few guidelines for courts on the complex issue of pornography. 
B. INCONSISTENCIES OF THE AMERICAN NON-ExPRESSION 
DEFINITION 
1. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 4s 
In order to deal with the distinction between expression and 
non-expression, the Supreme Court has stretched far to circum-
vent the Miller test in order to allow states to regulate pornogra-
phy. To prohibit pornographic expression, the Court must either 
label explicit material as obscene speech and thus unprotected,'7 
or deem the sexual activity "conduct" and therefore regulable 
because conduct is not speech and therefore any impact on the 
First Amendment is "incidental. "48 The Supreme Court took the 
latter approach in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., upholding a 
public indecency statute used to ban nude dancing.49 . 
The Barnes Court upheld an Indiana public nudity statute 
which targeted nude dancers and required them to wear pasties 
and G-Strings.llo The Court held the statute constitutional be-
cause it had "other purposes" than proscribing free speech. III 
43. Other examples of restrictions on free speech to avoid harm which the United 
States has recognized include FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (overhearing 
of indecent speech by children); Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 (exposing juveniles and uncon-
senting adults to obscene material); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (harm 
due to a racist leaflet containing group libel); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568 (harm by 
speech coupled with the risk of imminent breach of the peace). 
44. See MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 322. See generally COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, 
supra note 26 (finding no direct link between harm to women and pornography). 
45. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594 (discussing the regulation of sexually explicit 
material on the basis of offensiveness rather than harm). 
46. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (upholding an Indiana public indecency statute as applied 
to nude dancing). 
47. See discussion supra part II.A; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15. 
48. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2456. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 2459. 
51. [d. at 2463. The Court found that the pur'pose of the statute, although not ar-
ticulated in the statute, was to preserve societal order and morality, not to restrict free 
8
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Since the intent of the statute was not to regulate speech, but 
simply to regulate the offensive conduct of public nudity for 
purposes of societal order and morality, the Court found any 
First Amendment infringements incidental. Ci2 
The Barnes Court acknowledged the expressive value of 
erotic dancing. Ci3 However, the Court held thatthe nudity aspect 
of the dance was mere conduct which was on "the outer perime-
ters" of the First Amendment. Ci4 The Court concluded that nude 
erotic dancing was entitled to only a small degree of First 
Amendment protection. CiCi 
The majority's separation of "non-expressive nudity" from 
the "expression of dancing" was strongly criticized in Justice 
White's dissent.Ci6 Justice White noted that the nudity itself was 
an expressive component of the erotic dancing and not simply 
conduct:Ci7 
It is only because nude dancing performances 
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism 
and sensuality among the spectators that the 
State seeks to regulate such expressive activity, 
apparently on the assumption that creating or 
emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the 
minds of the spectators may lead to increased 
prostitution and the degradation of women.G8 
A person's nudity cannot be independent from the accom-
panying actions of the body which convey a message. The major-
speech.Id. The Court stated that this purpose was unrelated to the suppression of free-
dom of expression and therefore legitimate. Id. at 2462. 
52. Id. at 2456. 
53.Id. 
54. Id. at 2459 (Souter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Souter stated 
that "the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since the pernicious 
effects are merely associated with nude dancing establishments and are not the result of 
the expression inherent in nude dancing." Id .. 
55. See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives In Search of The First Amendment: The 
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611, 651 (1992) (discussing 
Justice Souter's concession that nudity by itself can be expressive). 
56. Justice White criticized the. majority opinion, stating that "[tJhe nudity element 
of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct' indepen-
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ity's treatment of "nudity" as· independent from the very act of 
dancing highlights the contrived nature of the American obscen-
ity doctrine, which treats all obscene material as non-expression. 
2. American Booksellers Ass'n.v. Hudnut5S 
In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit struck down an Indianapolis stat-
ute which prohibited subordinating depictions of women in por-
nography as a form of sex discrimination.6o Catharine 
MacKinnon, an anti-pornography feminist and a drafter of the 
ordinance, defines pornography as a civil rights violation.61 Ac-
cording to MacKinnon, pornography, as an expression of male 
domination and women's servility, institutionalizes inequality 
and male supremacy.62 MacKinnon faults the court for treating 
pornography as simple depictions of sex while ignoring the fact 
that pornography perpetuates the objectification of women 
through such depictions.63 
59. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down an Indianapolis ordinance as con-
tent-based regulation). 
60. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324. The ordinance described pornography as, "the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words." [d. The ordi-
nance also described pornography as depicting one or more of the following: 
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or 
humiliation; or 
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience 
sexual pleasure in being raped; or 
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or 
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or 
truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or 
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or 
animals; or 
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, 
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, 
bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sex-
ual; or 
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, 
conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through 
postures or positions of servility or submission or display. 
INDIANAPOLIS. IND .. CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16 § 16-3(q) (1984). See also 
MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 26 (defending her position on the ordinance). 
61. MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 18: "What pornography does goes beyond its con-
tent: it eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and submission 
sex. Inequality is its central dynamic .... " 
62. [d. 
63. MacKinnon argues that pornography portrays heinous abuses of women, "[o)nly 
in the pornography it is called something else: sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively. 
10
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A striking failure of the Indianapolis ordinance was its re-
fusal to incorporate any of the safeguards encompassed in the 
Miller formulation of obscenity, such as the artistic defense.64 
The Hudnut court criticized the ordinance for not providing an 
artistic defense.61i Unlike the Miller test's concern for artistic, 
political, or scientific expression,66 the Indianapolis ordinance 
did not accomodate the view that harmful pornography could 
have socially redeeming value.67 
In striking down the ordinance, the Hudnut court acknowl-
eged that pornographic material expresses ideas.6s The court 
emphasized that such ideas were powerful in forming attitudes 
and beliefs,69 and likened it to political speech, which merits the 
highest protection of the First Amendment.7o The court found 
Pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and child sexual 
abuse ... [Ilt eroticizes the dominance and submission that is the dynamic common to 
them all." [d. at 17. 
64. When a work has socially redeeming artistic or literary value, the obscene as-
pects may not be banned. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20. Following this reasoning, the Hudnut 
court criticizes the Indianapolis ordinance for targeting particular depictions in the work, 
not to the work judged as a whole, which the Miller definition requires. Hudnut, 771 
F.2d at 325. 
65. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for an explanation of Miller's artistic 
defense for works with redeeming scientific, political or literary value. 
66. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24. 
67. See INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16, § 16-3(q)(1984). 
68. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (explaining that pornography expresses powerful ideas, 
the court stated, "Pornography affects how people see the world, their fellows, and social 
relations."). In contrast to Barnes, the Hudnut court concluded that the ordinance regu-
lated speech rather than the conduct involved in making pornography. The court inti-
mated that the regulation of speech could be justified only by a compelling interest in 
reducing sex discrimination, which the court found that Indianapolis had not estab-
lished. [d. at 326. Compare Hudnut with Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458, where the Court 
held the state had established a compelling interest in avoiding secondary harms from 
nude dancing establishments from the legislative history, although the statute did not 
explicitly set forth such an interest. 
69. In answering the anti-pornographers' position that pornography perpetuates 
harm to women, the court reasoned that this was evidence of the pornographic materials' 
power as speech. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. 
70. The Hudnut court likened pornographic speech to other highly controversial 
ideological and political speech, such as Communism and Marxism, pointing out that 
when speech is controversial, it merits even higher protection: 
If pornography is what pornography does, so is other speech . 
. Hitler's orations affected how some Germans saw Jews. Com-
munism is a world view, not simply a Manifesto by Marx and 
Engels or a set of speeches. Efforts to suppress communist 
speech in the United States were based on the belief that the 
public acceptability of such ideas would increase the likeli-
hood of totalitarian government . . . . Yet all is protected 
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that the drafters of the ordinance were trying to regulate speech 
on the basis of content.71 This rendered the ordinance view-
point-based legislation which the court held unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. 72 
C. American Booksellers Ass'n u. Hudnut: THE AMERICAN OB-
SCENITY DEFINITION'S INABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE THE HARM 
FROM PORNOGRAPHY 
The extreme differences in the results of Barnes and Hud-
nut illustrate the inconsistent application of the American ob-
scenity definition. The Hudnut decision exemplifies the difficul-
ties the rigid constraints the obscenity doctrine presents to 
courts in trying to deal with pornography's harmful effects.73 
The anti-pornography feminists describe three categories of 
harms generated by the pornography industry: 1) exploitation of 
those participating in the production of pornography,'" 2) en-
couragement of sex crimes which would not have otherwise been 
committed by the audiences of pornography,7Ii and 3) discrimi-
nation fostered by pornography's social conditioning.76 
In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with exten-
sive empirical evidence by proponents of the anti-pornography 
ordinance of pervasive physical, mental, and behavioral harms.77 
speech, however insidious. 
Id. at 329-30. 
71. Id. at 325. 
72. Id. at 330. The court found that the material presented an idea, no matter how 
controversial, and as such, should be afforded constitutional protection. 
73. For further discussion on the constraints of the American obscenity doctrine, see 
Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329; TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16; Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, 
at 181; MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 329-40. 
74. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 595. 
75.Id. 
76. Id. For a comprehensive list of various psychological reports and recent statisti-
cal studies regarding the harms generated by pornography, see generally MACKINNON, 
supra note 5, at 304 n.6. 
77. See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue For Women, 21 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 55 (1986). The article is a transcript of Dworkin's testimony before the 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, during its hearings at the United 
States Court of International Trade in New York City, Jan. 22, 1986. Dworkin presents 
an in-depth and highly emotional discussion of the harms the Indianapolis ordinance was. 
trying to target. She first speaks about the exploitation of women in the industry, how 
most come from poor backgrounds where they have not had opportunities in society. Id. 
at 56. They are raped, maimed, abused, and tortured in pornography. Id. at 55-57. Por-
12
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The proposed ordinance did not aim to prohibit pornography 
because of its sexual explicitness. Rather, the ordinance targeted 
the degrading and subordinate depictions of women in pornogra-
phy and the injury women suffer from these portrayals.78 
The Hudnut court acknowledged that pornography harms 
women, stating: "Therefore we accept the premises of this legis-
lation. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordi-
nation. The subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront 
and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and 
rape on the streets."79 Such acknowledgement was the furthest 
limit of the Hudnut court's ability to address such harm, how-
ever.80 The court immediately went on to hold that these "un-
happy effects ... simply demonstrate[] the power of pornogra-
phy as speech. "81 The court stated that the power of expression 
in pornography is what requires the protection of the First 
Amendment.82 Thus, the Hudnut holding demonstrates how de-
grading pornography which falls outside the obscenity definition 
will not be recognized as harmful under the American approach. 
nography also creates the atmosphere for sexual harassment in jobs, in education and on 
the streets. Id. at 57. It encourages men to sexually assault women, to treat them as 
objects and to humiliate them. Id. at 56. She further explains that the harm to women by 
pornography is invisible because most sexual abuse still occurs in private, even though 
there is photographic documentation of it, called the pornography industry. Id. at 60. 
78. See INDIANAPOLIS. IND. CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16, § 16-3(q) 
(1984). 
79. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. 
80. Id. at 326. The court appears to have ignored the legislative history of'the ordi-
nance, which addresses the lowered social status and abuse women face from the degrad-
ing pornographic depictions in certain materials, holding that "[t]he regulation of speech 
could be justified, the [trial] court thought, only by a compelling interest in reducing sex 
discrimination, an interest that Indianapolis had not established." Id. See also MacKin-
non, supra note 35, at 20. Professor MacKinnon argues that the evidence of harm before 
the legislature is given no weight at all. Professor MacKinnon also scathingly indicts the 
court for taking the "blame-the-victim-misogyny" view that, "[aJdult women generally 
have the capacity to protect themselves from participating in and being personally vic-
timized by pornography." Id. (quoting American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 11 Media 
L. Rep. 1105, 1119 (S.D. Ind. 1984)). Compare Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 3326, with Barnes, 
111 S. Ct. at 2461, where the Supreme Court inferred a compelling interest in preserving 
the morals of a community absent any legislative history on the fact: "It is impossible to 
discern, other than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the 
Indiana legislators had in mind when they enacted this statute. . . . Nonetheless, the 
statute's purpose of protecting societal order and morality is clear . . . . " Barnes at 
2461. 
81. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. Compare id. at 329 with Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458 
(allowing regulation of the harmful secondary effects of nudity in dancing). 
82. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. 
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D.. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION OF OTHER HARMS AS A 
BASIS FOR REGULA.TING SPEECH 
Unlike obscenity, where offensiveness is the only "harm" 
recognized, other categories of speech are regulated on the basis 
of avoiding antisocial behavior and attitudinal harms.ss Child 
pornography, group libel, fighting words, and the location of 
adult theaters are all regulated on the basis of the potential 
harms they may cause. 
1. Child Pornography - New York u. Ferbers4 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a strong 
state interest in avoiding harm to children.sli In New York u. 
Ferber, the Court examined the constitutionality of a New York 
criminal statute which prohibited knowing distribution and pro-
motion of sexual performances by children under the age of 16.s8 
The Ferber court departed from the strict Miller test and al-
lowed states greater latitude in regulation of pornography where 
the well-being of children was involved.87 The Court reasoned 
that, "the use of children as ... subject[s]of pornographic 
materials is· very harmful to both the children and the society as 
a whole. "88 The Court permitted states to enact legislation which 
did not incorporate an artistic defense, reasoning that the state 
83. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding zoning 
laws which disperse adult theaters because of harmful secondary effects); Young, 427 
U.S. at 50 (upholding zoning of adult theatres because of harmful effects). 
84. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a New York criminal statute prohibiting the dis· 
tribution of child pornography). 
85. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747. For other cases which involve children and obscene or 
indecent materials, see Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739·41 (permitting government to 
restrict the broadcasting of non-obscene offensive language, in part because of danger to 
children); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973) (stressing the special problems 
of keeping obscene printed material from being distributed to children); Paris Adult 
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 58 n.7 (1973) (noting that because books are portable and durable, 
simply banning children from adult movie houses does not adequately protect juveniles). 
See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (permitting government to restrict dissemination of ob· 
scene materials because of the danger of exposure to juveniles). 
86. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747. 
87. See id. at 753. 
88. S. REP. No. 95·438, at 5 (1977), quoted in Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9. These 
words echo the analysis in Miller, which recognized that states have a legitimate interest 
in prohibiting dissemination of obscene material when the dissemination has a signifi-
cant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to minors. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 775. 
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had a compelling interest in forbidding sexual acts involving mi-
nors.89 Ferber shows the Court's willingness to restrict speech in 
order to safeguard children's emotional and physical well-being. 
2. Clear and Present Danger 
Hampshire90 
Chaplinsky v. New 
The Supreme Court is also willing to restrict speech, regard-
less of its political or ideological value, when the speech presents 
danger of an "imminent breach of the peace."91 In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting 
words "tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the 
peace . . . . "92 The Court reiterated "that Freedom of 
Speech ... [is] among the fundamental personal rights and 
liberties which are protected ... [against] state action."93 The 
Court held, however, that prohibition of certain classes of speech 
presents no constitutional problem because their very utterance 
inflicts injury.94 
3. Group Libel - Beauharnais v. Illinois95 
Group libel is a category where the American courts have 
restricted speech on the basis of harm without a showing of clear 
and present danger.96 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale or advertising of 
materials which "portray[] depravity, criminality, unchastity, or 
lack of virtue, of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or 
religion."97 The Court recognized that the State of Illinois could 
89. [d. at 761. The Court asserted that "the Miller standard, like all general defini-
tions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's particular and more 
compelling interest [in protecting children] .... " [d. 
90. 315 U.S. 572 (1942) (upholding a statute prohibiting speech which tends to in-
cite a breach of the peace). 
91. [d. at 572. 
92. [d. at 573. 
93. [d. at 570-71. 
94. [d. at 571-72. 
95. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of materials which 
denigrate a certain class of citizens). 
96. [d. at 250. Although the vitality of Beauharnais has been brought into question, 
the United States Supreme Court continues to rely on it. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul ordinance prohibiting the display 
of a burning cross); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. 
97. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251. 
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legitimately address the harm in group libel without a showing 
of clear and present danger.9s 
The Illinois statute sought to address tensions between 
races which often escalated into violence and destruction.99 As a 
result, the Beauharnais Court held that the state could ration-
ally infer that the racist utterances in question played a signifi-
cant part in such violence. loo Even though there was less than 
conclusive empirical evidence that racist utterances incited vio-
lence,lol the Court allowed restriction of such utterances in the 
interest of avoiding societal harm. l02 
4. Zoning 
The Supreme Court frequently employs "reasonable time, 
place, and manner" restrictions to regulate the harmful effects 
of pornography. loa Here, the Court recognizes that pornographic 
theaters cause substantial harm to property values because of 
their tendency to attract criminal elements i~to neighborhoods. 
The adult theaters may. thus be regulated in order to minimize 
that damage. l04 The "harmful" secondary effects of permitting 
pornography to flourish in neighborhoods give state legislatures 
ample justification to enact stringent zoning laws to restrict such 
activity. 1011 
98. Id. at 266. 
99. Id. at 259. 
100. Id. 
101. The Beauharnais Court relied on various commission reports and instances 
within their own community to support the notion of harm caused by the racist utter-
ances.Id. 
102. See R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541-46. The Court's decision again brings into ques-
tion the vitality of Beauharnais. The Court seems to be moving away from allowing 
regulation of speech on the basis of non-imminent harm to a group. Justice Scalia's opin-
ion appears to be retreating back into the categorical approach which only allows regula-
tion in certain narrow classes of speech which do not have "traditional First Amendment' 
values" and therefore no expressive value. Note, however, that Justice Stevens' concur-
rence reminds the Court that the focus of speech regulation should be on the harm 
speech causes. Id. at 2569-70 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
103. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 41; Young, 427 U.S. at 50. 
104. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 ("The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent 
crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values ... not to suppress the 
expression of unpopular views."). 
105. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 ("[AJ concentration of 'adult' movie theaters 
causes the 'area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attribu-
table to theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect which these 
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In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc./os the Supreme Court 
upheld an ordinance which intended to prevent harmful second-
ary effects of pornography by geographically dispersing adult 
theaters.107 The Court concluded that the Renton ordinance was 
content-neutral because it was not aimed at the substantive 
message of the obscene movies, but at the secondary effects 
these movies had on crime rates, neighborhood quality and 
property value.108 Ostensibly, the Court did not advocate a com-
plete ban on adult establishment!;l.109 
The Court's willingness to uphold zoning ordinances which 
greatly restrict access to pornographic establishments highlights 
the Court's awareness of some of the harms the pornography in-
dustry generates. no The Court's remedy for pornographic harms, 
however, is to place the pornography out of sight or disperse it 
zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech."); 
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he State's interest in preventing 
the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments - prostitution, sexual as-
saults, and other criminal activity - is sufficient ... to justify the law's enforcement 
against nude dancing."). Compare Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458, with Butler, [1992] 1 
S.C.R. at 507. The Butler court rejects the use of reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions since the harm remains the same and is simply shifted to other areas under 
such restrictions: 
Once it has been established that the objective is the avoid-
ance of harm ... it is untenable to argue that these harms 
could be avoided by placing restrictions on access to such ma-
terial. Making the materials more difficult to obtain by in-
creasing their cost and reducing their availability does not 
achieve [the avoidance of harm]. Once Parliament has reason-
ably concluded that certain acts are harmful to certain groups 
in society and to society in general, it would be inconsistent, if 
not hypocritical, to argue that such acts could be committed in 
more restrictive conditions. The harm sought to be avoided 
would remain the same in either case. 
[d. at 507-08. 
106. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding an ordinance which dispersed adult theaters be-
cause of harmful secondary effects on neighborhoods around the theaters). 
107. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. The Renton Court recognized that adult theaters and 
the movies shown in them increase crime in neighborhoods. The ordinance mandated 
that adult establishments be more than one thousand feet away from the nearest resi-
dential neighborhoods. 
108. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 612. 
109. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. The Court reasoned that as long as there are alterna-
tive avenues of communication, free speech has not been abrogated. The ordinance does 
not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be 
located within 1000 feet of any residential zone. 
110. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 612-13. 
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in "non-residential" neighborhoods.lll This fails to recognize 
that the fundamental harm from pornography remains the same, 
whether in wealthy or poor neighborhoods, whether there is one 
or a dozen adult theaters.ll2 
III. RECOGNIZING HARM TO WOMEN FROM 
PORNOGRAPHY AS A BASIS FOR REGULATION 
The United States Supreme Court recognizes harm in its 
decisions dealing with child pornography, fighting words, group 
libel and zoning ordinances. In all of these areas, the Supreme 
Court balances the value of the speech with the compelling in-
terest of avoiding harm.1l3 This is not the case with pornogra-
phy, however. The Supreme Court's resistance to extending such 
an approach to pornography, and insistence on using the obscen-
ity definition as a standard, is symptomatic of the Court's re-
fusal to recognize pornography for what it clearly is - expres-
sion.114 The effect of the Supreme Court's categorical approach 
is to make the laws dealing with pornography, as the Miller 
Court recognized, "a hodge-podge."l1li 
The Supreme Court never recognizes the expressive value of 
depictions of sex. As a result, courts cannot legitimize concerns 
of women harmed by pornography.116 In contrast to the Ameri-
can approach, the recent Canadian Supreme Court decision of 
R. v. Butler applies a harms-based analysis to pornography 
while recognizing the expressive value of all forms of sex. 
111. See Dworkin, supra note 77, at 59. The author criticizes zoning ordinances as 
ineffective for dealing with the harmful effects of pornographic establishments: 
Zoning laws impose pornography on poor neighborhoods, on 
working-class neighborhoods, on neighborhoods where people 
of color live, and all of those people have to deal with the in-
crease of crime, the terrible harassment, the degradation of 
the quality of life in their neighborhoods, and the politicians 
get to protect the property values of the rich. 
112. See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507 (discussing the hypocritical nature of zoning 
which merely relocates the problem, yet leaves the harms intact). 
113. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 602-03. 
114. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16; Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. I, 18 (1992) ("Obscenity does not count as speech; the Supreme Court 
treats it as sex rather than expression."). 
115. Miller, 413 U.S. at 43. 
116. See discussion supra note 77 on the harms the Hudnut court failed to 
recognize. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/7
1993] R. v. BUTLER 669 
A. THE CANADIAN ApPROACH: R. V. BUTLER 
On February 27, 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld a criminal obscenity statute prohibiting "undue 
exploitation of sex" in pornographic materials.1l7 The Canadian 
criminal obscenity statute defines obscenity as: "[A]ny publica-
tion a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploita-
tion of sex, or of sex and anyone or more of the following sub-
jects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty or violence, shall be deemed 
to be obscene. "118 
The Butler analysis employs a "community standards" test 
to determine what material falls in this category.1I9 While the 
American Miller community standards test targets what is "of-
fensive" to the community, the Butler analysis targets "harm" 
which the community is not willing to tolerate.12o The court held 
that "the community standards test is concerned not with what 
Canadians would not tolerate themselves being exposed to, but 
what they would not tolerate other Canadians being exposed 
to."121 
The Butler court held that the statute in question violated 
Canada's freedom of expression clause.122 However, the limita-
tions the statute imposed on pornography were reasonably justi-
fied under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which guarantees 
"the rights and freedoms set out in [the Canadian freedom of 
expression clause] subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstratively justified in a free and 
117. Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 163(8) (1985) (Can.). See also Mahoney, 
supra note 13, at 78. 
118. R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 163(8) (1985) (Can.) (emphasis added). 
119. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 485. Harm in this context means that "it predisposes 
persons to act in an anti-social manner .... Anti-social conduct for this purpose is con-
duct which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning." [d. 
120. Basing a community standards test on "harm" leads to a more uniform ap-
proach to what society will consider intolerable. Offensiveness is a more subjective and 
abstract concept which will fluctuate depending on different contexts. Notions of harm 
are far more concrete and less susceptible to individual interpretations. 
121. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 478. 
122. CAN. CONST: (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), § 2(b): "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... freedom of 
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication." This provision is substantially similar to the first amendment in the 
United States. 
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democratic society."123 The Butler court held that the statute's 
regulation of certain pornographic materials was constitutionally 
permissible under Canadian law in the interest of avoiding harm 
and promoting equality.124 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
In Butler, the government seized pornographic materials 
from a video, magazine and sexual paraphernalia ShOp.1211 The 
owner was charged with several counts of selling obscene mate-
rial, possessing obscene material for distribution or sale, and ex-
posing obscene material to public view in contravention of Sec.-
tion 163 of the Criminal Code.126 
The trial court acquitted the owner of most of the charges, 
on the grounds that the freedom of expression clause in Section 
2(b) of the Canadian Charter protected the seized materials.127 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and en-
tered convictions on all counts, holding that the seized materials 
fell outside the protection of the Charter.128 The defendant then 
appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.129 
2. Butler's Recognition of Pornography as Expression 
First, Butler determined that pornographic material is ex-
123. CAN. CONST. pt. 1, § 1. In contrast to the United States Constitution, Section 1 
specifically allows for limitations on freedom of expression in the interest of furthering a 
free and democratic society, such as equality. 
124. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 509. See also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 103. 
125. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 461. 
126. [d. Section 163 reads: 
[d. at 469. 
(1) Everyone commits an offence who 
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in 
his possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or 
circulation any obscene written matter, picture, model, phono-
graph record or other thing whatever .... 
(8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant 
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of 
sex and anyone or more of the following subjects, namely, 
crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be 
obscene. 
127. [d. at 461. See also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 79. 
128. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 462. 
129. [d. 
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pressive and thus merits protection under the Canadian Consti-
tution's freedom of expression clause. ISO The Canadian Supreme 
Court rejected the appellate court's holding that the depiction of 
purely physical activity had no expressive content.1a1 The Su-
preme Court asserted: 
[I]n creating a film, regardless of its content, the 
maker of the film is consciously choosing the par-
ticular images which together constitute the film. 
In choosing his or her images, the creator of the 
film is attempting to convey some meaning. The 
meaning to be ascribed to the work cannot be 
measured by the reaction of the audience, which 
in some cases, may amount to no more than phys-
ical arousal or shock.132 
Butler concluded that videos, magazines, and other sexual 
gadgets convey meaning and fall within the ambit of expres-
sion.1s3 Because Section 163 of the Criminal Code specifically 
sought to restrict certain types of expressive activity, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court held that the Code infringed upon freedom 
of expression. 134 
The Canadian Charter's equality clause specifically permits 
a certain amount of restriction on freedom of speech.135 Such re-
striction is permissible because Section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter firmly recognizes everyone's right to equality as a para-
mount constitutional provision.136 Specifically, Section 15 pro-
vides that: "Every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the 
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimi-
130. Id. at 489. Because Section 163(8) of the Criminal Code sought to restrict ma-
terial which communicates "undue exploitation of sex," the Section clearly infringed the 
freedom of expression clause of the Canadian Charter. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 489-90. 
133. Id. at 488. 
134. Id. at 489. 
135. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1). 
136. See Kathleen Mahoney, R. v. Keegstra, 37 MCGILL L.J. 242, 243 (1992). Com-
pare CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1) with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which states: "No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id. 
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nation based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability."137 
This Section allows the Canadian courts to freely address 
the harms perpetuated by pornography while acknowledging its 
expressive value.188 Because of this, Butler balances the expres-
sive value of explicit material against other interests.13s 
3. Butler's Recognition of the Harms Implicit in Pornography 
Butler next considered whether the objectives of Section 
163 justified restricting the expression in pornographic material 
on the basis of its harm.lolo Here, the court held that the aim of 
Section 163 was the avoidance of harm to society posed by un-
due exploitation of sex. l4l Unlike the American view, Butler wid-
ened the focus from simply viewing pornographic material as 
corrupting public morals. 142 Butler also focused on the sociologi-
cal, political, and psychological effects from pornography in its 
analysis. 1ol3 
Butler defined harm in this context as "predispos[ing] per-
sons to act in an antisocial manner as, for example, the physical 
or mental mistreatment of women by men."l"" Specifically, the 
degrading depiction of women in pornography and the negative 
perceptions and attitudes resulting from such depictions falls 
within the Butler definition of harm.1ol11 This directly contrasts 
the United States Supreme Court's view that pornography's 
137. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1). 
138. See Mahoney, supra note 13, at 79. 
139. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 511. 
140. Id. at 489. 
141. Id. at 492. The court found that the statute's objectives were not aimed at 
restricting public and sexual morality solely because it reflected the conventions of a 
given community. 
142. Id. at 492-93. Butler rejects a notion of legal moralism, noting that "[tJhe pre-
vention of 'dirt for dirt's sake' is not a legitimate objective which would justify the viola-
tion of one of the most fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter." Id. 
143. Butler uses Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which guarantees equality, to 
alleviate some of the harms of sexual discrimination by regulating pornography. Id. at 
511. See also MACKINNON, supra Mte 5, at 195-214 (also following the view that regula-
tion of pornography is valid to redress the inequality women face); Mahoney, supra note 
136, at 268. 
144. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 485. 
145. Id. at 504. 
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harm is its offensiveness. 146 
Butler examines pornography's tendency to incite violence 
such as rape and battery towards women.147 The court also ex-
plored the more insidious types of harm pornography generates, 
including changing attitudinal beliefs regarding acceptable levels 
of violence against women in society.H8 Butler's approach is in 
accord with the position set forth by Catharine MacKinnon, An-
drea Dworkin and other anti-pornography feminists in the 
United States.H9 
The Butler court articulates several of the well-established 
United States anti-pornographers' arguments in its balancing 
test of harms versus free speech considerations.lIIO Butler's anal-
ysis implicitly adopts the three categories of gender-related 
harms articulated by the anti-pornography feminists. m 
Butler cited with approval the specific harms articulated by 
the Report on Pornography by the Standing Committee on Jus-
tice and Legal Affairs. m -The Report provides: 
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type 
of material is that it reinforces some unhealthy 
tendencies in Canadian society. The effect of this 
type of material is to reinforce male-female ste-
reotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It at-
146. See discussion supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text on the morality-based 
American obscenity doctrine. 
147. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507-08. 
148. [d. at 496-97. It is unclear whether Butler's willingness to recognize harms 
would extend as far as the types of harms recognized by radical feminists in the United 
States. Note Professor MacKinnon's very liberal view of what constitutes sexual assault: 
The figure [of sexual assault] includes all the forms of rape or 
other sexual abuse or harassment surveyed, non-contact as 
well as contact, from gang-rape by strangers to obscene phone 
calls, unwanted sexual advances on the street, unwelcome re-
quests to pose for pornography, and subjection to 'Peeping 
Toms' and sexual exhibitionists. 
MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 16 n.31. 
149. See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 56-60 (discussing the silencing of women 
through subordinate depictions in pornography); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 84-89 
(describing various views on harm from types of speech); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594-
602 (discussing harm in 'pornography as a basis of regulation). 
150. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. at 493-94. 
151. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 508. See also Sunstein, supra note 10, at 595; supra 
notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
152. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. at 493-94. 
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tempts to make degradation, humiliation, victimi-
zation, and violence in human relationships 
appear normal and acceptable. A society which 
hQlds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensu-
alism, and mutuality are basic to any human in-
teraction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justi-
fied in controlling and prohibiting any medium of 
depiction, description or advocacy which violates 
these principles. 1&8 
Following the Report's findings, the court found that certain 
themes in pornographic material were harmful because they had 
a detrimental impact on individuals exposed to them and conse-
quently on society as a whole. 1114 
The Butler court concluded that avoidance of harm against 
women and children constituted a legitimate objective of the 
statute.11i1i The court held that such harm was sufficiently press-
ing and substantial to restrict freedom of expression. 1116 
IV. BUTLER'S BALANCE OF HARMS: PORNOGRAPHY 
vs. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Finally, Butler balanced the interest in avoiding harm to 
women against freed('.,.,-:n of expression. 11i7 The court found that 
the anti-pornography statute provided a rational and propor-
tional means to further the interest of avoiding societal harm 
153. CAN. HOUSE COMM. STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. RE-
PORT ON PORNOGRAPHY, Issue No. 18, (1978), cited with approval in Butler, [1992] 1 
S.C.R. at 493-94. 
154. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 500. The court made the distinction between harmful 
pornography and "good" pornography. The objective of the criminal statute was not to 
inhibit the celebration of human sexuality. Such "good" pornography has value because 
it "validates women's will to pleasure. It celebrates female nature. It validates a range of 
female sexuality that is wider and truer than that legitimated by the non-pornographic 
culture. Pornography when it is good celebrates both female pleasure and male rational-
ity." Id. (citing Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance 
and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 4 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 681, 696 (1987)). 
155. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507 ("[T]he objective is the avoidance of harm 
caused by the degradation which many women feel as 'victims' of the message of obscen-
ity, and of the negative impact exposure to such material has on perceptions and atti-
tudes towards women .... "). 
156. Id. at 498. 
157. Id. at 499. 
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without unduly burdening freedom of expression.1Ii8 
The Canadian Supreme Court held that prohibition of por-
nographic materials which cause harm minimally impairs free-
dom of expression.1Ii9 Since the statute prohibited only sexually 
explicit pornography which was "violent or degrading," the pro-
vision was valid for two reasons.160 First, the provision left un-
touched materials which had artistic or literary value.16l Sec-
ondly, the statute targeted only, public distribution rather than 
private possession.162 Therefore, the restrictions on violent and 
degrading pornography were easier to justify. 163 
Butler also found that the Canadian legislature had no al-
ternate and less intrusive measures to accomplish the objectives 
of avoiding harm to women and society.164 The court rejected 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions as "inconsistent 
and hypocritical" because such restrictions did not alter the fun-
damental harmful effects of the pornographic material.161i Conse-
quently, the court held the harm sought to be avoided would 
remain the same.166 
v. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUTLER FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 
Opponents of anti-pornography legislation argue that cen-
158. To be consistent with the Charter, the restrictions imposed by a statute must 
be rationally connected and proportional to the legislative objective" This includes an 
inquiry into whether there exists: 1) a rational connection between the impugned mea-
sures and the objective, 2) minimal impairment of the right or freedom, and 3) a proper 
balance between the effects of the limiting measures and the legislative objective. [d, 
159. [d, at 505. 
160. [d, 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 501. The Butler court also found pornographic material did not stand on 
equal footing with other speech because it was motivated by economic profit. [d, See also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw, U. L, REV, 555 (1989) (presenting 
an overview of the different categories of high and low value speech). 
163. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 503. 
164, [d, at 507-09. The court acknowledged education and other measures as means 
to address the problem of pornography. However, the court found these measures were 
responses to the harm from pornography and did not control the dissemination of the 
images that contribute to subordinating attitudes. Thus, the means did not control the 
cause of the problem, merely the effects. 
165. [d. at 507. 
166. [d, 
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sorship of pornography would start American courts down a 
slippery slope where critical political speech would soon be cen-
sored.167 This concern appears unmerited, given the willingness 
of the Supreme Court to regulate areas of speech where "seri-
ous" harms are at stake, such as harm to children from pornog-
raphy or secondary effects of zoning.166 More importantly, this 
concern obfuscates the underlying trivialization of pornographic 
harms implicit in the American courts' refusal to depart from 
the traditional obscenity definition and its outdated categorical 
approach. 
It is unclear how the American treatment of obscenity as 
non-expression helps keep political speech unfettered.169 In-
stead, labelling obscene material as "unprotected" merely masks 
the true issues and disempowers American courts from directly 
tackling concerns about the effects of pornography.l7O Pornogra-
phy labelled as "obscenity" cannot be non-expressive when it 
deals with one of the most intimate, emotional and highly 
charged of human activities. l7l The intensity surrounding the 
pornography debate testifies to pornography's expressive 
power.172 
Using a Butler-type analysis in the United States would al-
low the courts to deal honestly with the issue of pornography 
and its effects while recognizing its value as expression. Ameri-
can courts could legitimize the harm behind pornographic ex-
pression while accommodating First Amendment concerns 
through a balancing test which Butler provides. Butler breaks 
away from the rigid categorization of obscenity versus speech 
and widens the judicial perspective to encompass other issues. 
In Hudnut, a Butler-type analysis would not have trivial-
ized the importance of pornography's harm to women in balanc-
ing First Amendment concerns.178 The Butler analysis would 
167. For an in-depth discussion on why pornography restrictions are not leading the 
United States down a "slippery slope," see Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 203-05. 
168. See discussion supra part II.D on the United States Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of other types of harm. 
169. See Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 203. 
170. See MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 3. 
171. See Bowers, 458 U.s. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
172. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329; MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 17. 
173. See discussion supra part III.A.3 regarding Butler's harm analysis. 
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have addressed sex discrimination and other tangible harms 
from pornography. Like the American approach, however, the 
Butler analysis also would have recognized that the stringent In-
dianapolis ordinance was an impermissible infringement on ex-
pression because of its refusal to recognize the artistic value in 
pornographic materials. The Butler analysis shows that the First 
Amendment concerns can be accomodated while treating serious 
problems perpetuated by pornography. 
A Butler analysis would have reached the same result in 
Hudnut, but would have left the door open for other anti-por-
nography ordinances based on a harms-equality approach to 
succeed. Women's victimization due to pornography would have 
been validated as harms that society needs to protect against, 
instead of being dismissed as "unhappy effects" which are neces-
sary to the marketplace of ideas. 
Butler's willingness to recognize pornography as expression, 
would have rendered a very different result in Barnes.174 Under 
the Butler analysis, American courts would not have to separate 
the nudity from erotic dancing.17II A Butler approach would al-
low courts to acknowledge the expressive value of the dancing in 
its totality.176 By acknowledging this expressive value, Butler 
can look at the effects of nude dancing on the community as a 
whole. Butler would not restrict courts to analyzing "secondary 
effects" in neighborhoods. Butler would allow courts to consider 
the subtle pervasive harms generated by women stripping in 
front of men in bars, not simply whether the nudity of the dance 
affronts a public sense of decency. A Butler analysis would pro-
vide a more complete and realistic approach to the regulation of 
nude dancing. 
174. Contra Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (distinguishing between non-expressive 
nudity and expressive dancing). 
175. Id. 
176. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 487 (stating that although the subject matter may 
depict only physical activity, the subject matter may conveyor attempt to convey ideas 
through such activity). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Butler's recognition of pornography as expression is an in-
vigorating change from the United States Supreme Court's dog-
matic decency-based Miller standard with its cloudy underlying 
rationales. The Miller obscenity definition does not accomodate 
expressive value in sexually explicit materials which are offen-
sive, but protects violent and misogynist pornography because of 
the "powerful" ideology it conveys.I77 
A recognition of pornography as expression currently allows 
Canadian courts to consider its harmful effects. Only when por-
nography is considered expression can the harm such expression 
perpetuates be recognized. 
In Butler, the court balanced concerns for freedom of ex-
pression against harm caused by pornographic expression. I78 The 
First Amendment in this country may cause the Supreme Court 
to weigh these interests somewhat differently than the Butler 
Court. However, a Butler approach still fits into the American 
constitutional framework, albeit different in scope. 
Ostensibly, a Butler approach in the United States seems to 
render similar results as those reached through the obscenity 
doctrine, yet it provides courts with a clearer set of guidelines 
for dealing with the issue of pornography. A Butler approach 
would also render those results through an analysis which ac-
knowledges harms instead of trying to hide them away. 
Justine Juson & Brenda Lillington * 
177. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. 
178. See discussion supra part IV. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. The authors wish to thank 
Jeremy D. Blank for his advice and editing suggestions while writing this article. The 
authors would also like to thank Professors Joan Howarth and Michael Zamperini for 
their contributions and support. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/7
